This paper proposes that, to increase the efficiency of public spending in oil-rich economies, some or all of the oil revenues be transferred to citizens, and fiscal instruments such as taxation be used to finance public expenditures. We develop the case as follows. First, we confirm the well-known result that public-expenditure efficiency is lower in oil-rich countries compared to other developing countries. Second, we show that this efficiency gap is associated with differences in accountability to citizens of government"s spending decisions. We find that various measures of accountability are systematically weaker in oil-rich countries. We attribute this difference to the fact that oil revenues typically accrue directly to the government, unlike tax revenues, which pass through the hands of citizens. Third, we show that, controlling for a number of factors, accountability is stronger in countries that rely more on direct taxation to finance public spending. We conclude that accountability, and hence public-expenditure efficiency, can be increased by transferring oil revenues to citizens and then taxing them to finance public spending. The paper reviews existing schemes that redistribute oil revenues to the population, such as the Alaska Citizen Fund, to assess the feasibility of our modest proposal in African countries. We conclude that, while it may be difficult to implement such a proposal in existing oil producers, there is scope for introducing it in some of Africa"s new oil producers.
Introduction
The literature on oil-rich economies has centered on demonstrating the (usually negative) impact of oil resources on macroeconomic stability, governance and growth.
It is a fact that a great majority of oil-rich developing countries fail to diversify their economies. Oil booms" pressures on wasteful spending and corruption --the driving force behind such inefficient expenditures--is well documented and led to the concept of a "natural resource curse" (see, for example, Warner (1995, 2001 ), Gylfason et al. (1999) , Leite and Weidmann (1999) , Auty (2001) , Moore (2007) ), although according to Lederman and Maloney (2007) , the resource curse is not a "destiny".
Because of the negative impact of oil resources on governance, the main policy recommendations for oil-rich economies have been threefold: (i) save oil revenues for future generations and mitigate the detrimental impact of volatility of oil revenue flows by appropriate fiscal stabilization mechanisms; (ii) increase transparency and efficiency of oil revenue collection and spending; and (iii) redistribute oil revenues to citizens to limit embezzlements of public funds (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003 , Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004 , Sandbu, 2006 . Dewatripont et al. (2006) even describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence to their constituencies.
Despite the need for better public spending efficiency, results continue to be disappointing in several oil-rich economies 2 and there are a growing number of studies demonstrating at the household level that citizens do not benefit from revenues derived from oil rents (Najman et al. 2008 ).
The literature on the impact of an oil boom neglects another literature, which makes the link between taxation and accountability of public spending. Taxation sets up the interaction between citizens and the State, with the former holding the latter accountable. Brautigam (2008) stresses that "state-building is shaped by societies, and taxation is a strategic nexus between the state and society" (p.25). The State can broaden the base and enforce the collection of tax revenues. As citizens pay higher taxes, they demand better service, which requires better public expenditures. The relationship usually referred to as a fiscal contract is a two-way relationship because broad-based taxation raises citizens" expectation about enhanced efficiency of public expenditures and the democratic process. What Karl (2007) calls the participation deficit, "a lack of connection between subjects and the state, which breaks any sense of ownership of public resources or consequent citizen engagement" seems to be one of the most important challenges for oil economies. The linkage has even been highlighted as central to avoiding the natural resource curse in natural resource rich countries (OECD, 2008) . Governments in oil-rich countries gather less revenue from domestic taxation (Henry and Springborg, 2001 ) and are therefore not held accountable (Bornhorst et al. 2008 , Moore 2007 . Capacity in tax administration is also more problematic (Knack 2008) and there emerge needs for States to enhance tax policy efficiency and administration (Levi, 1988; Bates and Lien, 1985) . As governments do not rely on revenues raised from taxing their citizens, they are not held accountable (Bird et al. 2008 ).
However, in policy recommendations for oil-rich economies, the fiscal contract is absent in the sense that the taxation of citizens is not considered, especially in developing countries, due to the fact that (i) the tax base is limited; (ii) tax administration capacity and governance are weak; and (iii) States do not need revenues from individual taxes.
There is therefore a vicious circle, which is difficult to break: less taxation of citizens implies less accountability and public scrutiny of public spending and low efficiency and poor service delivery, which further limits possibilities to tax citizens.
The purpose of this paper is to try and break that vicious circle by making the case for having some or all of oil revenues transferred directly to citizens, and then having the state tax citizens to finance public spending.
We build the case in three steps. First, in section 2, we show that high levels of oil revenues are associated with low levels of transparency in public budgets and efficiency in public spending. Next, we demonstrate empirically that without taxation of citizens, accountability of public spending is necessarily limited and without government accountability vis-à-vis citizens, public spending efficiency is likely to remain low. We conclude that transferring oil revenues to citizens and taxing them is one way of improving public spending efficiency. To see how this proposal could be implemented, in section 4, we present various schemes to redistribute oil revenues to citizens. In section 5, we present some concluding remarks and areas for future research.
The links among oil, accountability and poor outcomes of public spending
Low levels of budget transparency in oil-dependent countries are common and may lead to poor management of resource wealth over the medium to long term.
Countries such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea score 0 out of 100 on the Open Budget Index 2008 (Heuty et al. 2009) 3 .
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that public spending per capita in oilrich countries is much higher than in non-oil economies (see Figures 1 and 2 ). Not only are oil exports associated with higher public spending levels but the association is even higher in the case of large oil reserves (over 20 billions barrels). Large reserves induce confidence over the economic future of the country and, based on of the rationale of export diversification, public spending is increased. 
Oil economy
Furthermore, oil economies subsidize oil products and fuels, leading to poor energy efficiency and greater waste of resources. (see Figure 3 ).
Figure 3: Energy efficiency and oil exports
Finally, oil-dependent countries appear to have weaker expenditure control systems. Table 1 gives the average scores on three dimensions of expenditure accountability for oil producers, mineral producers and non-resource-dependent economies. It is clear that oil producing countries have greater difficulty managing revenue windfalls 4 . These countries face greater obstacles in designing long-term plans and linking them to medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets.
Moreover, the fact that revenues derived from oil production and exports are often 4 These countries, for instance, score 25 out of 100 on revenue volatility and forecasting-significantly lower than mineral producers (which score 63 out of 100) and non-resource dependent countries (54). 
The link between taxation, accountability and poor outcome of public spending: a cross-country analysis
Having confirmed that oil producing countries have generally weaker expenditure efficiency and accountability, we now investigate how taxation may help strengthen them. We proceed in two steps. First, we show how accountability has an effect on the outcomes of public spending. Then we show how taxation can have a discernible effect on accountability in oil-dependent economies.
From the literature, we know that there is an inverse relationship between oil dependence and the level of spending in education, all other things being equal, mainly due to overconfidence in the future and less of a need to invest in human capital (Gylfason, 2001 ). Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) demonstrate that efficiency of public spending in education is affected by the quality of governance (measured mainly by quality of bureaucracy and the level of corruption).
5 However, the OBI 2008 results also show that countries can be transparent and accountable to the public despite substantial natural resource endowments. For example, South Africa, Norway, Botswana, and Peru all show strong performance on the OBI relative to other hydrocarbon and mineral producers (Heuty et al. 2009 ).
In our first step, we test if accountability vis-à-vis citizens can affect the quality of public spending in education. Using the Rajkumar-Swaroop specification,
we introduce a measure of voice and accountability 6 extracted from Kaufman et al.
governance indicators 7 . Table 2 gives the results of this first step 8 . As expected, voice and accountability have indeed a strong association with the education outcome (secondary enrolment) even after controlling for spending level, GDP per capita and level of urbanization. The greater is the possibility for citizens to raise their voice, the better is the outcome of public spending. It is worth noting that even though control of corruption is with the expected sign, it is not significant, which may be explained by the fact that control of corruption and voice and accountability are correlated. The second step consists of examining if taxation can improve the accountability of government when oil-dependency lowers it.
Various recent micro empirical studies emphasize the need to broaden the tax base to citizens in order to create an interaction between citizens and governments and thereby increase spending efficiency. Table 3 summarizes the results of past studies and experiments. In addition to the overall level of taxation, the shift from trade taxes to more visible taxes of individuals appears to enhance accountability of the government. For example, although a VAT is an indirect tax, it has a certain degree of visibility. It is a tax on general consumption and hence relatively broad-based. Therefore it can effectively mobilize taxpayers while relieving the burden of bookkeeping on small businesses through commonly used threshold exemptions. VAT has been highly visible in Ghana and Uganda, where its introduction was contentious, and where recurrent political debate about VAT rates suggests that its political effect has been quite direct (OECD 2008) .
Therefore, in our second step, we test if the share of various taxes has an impact on accountability vis-à-vis citizens. The greater the share of taxes on trade (the least visible type of tax, and a narrower tax base), the less accountable the government is likely to be. Moreover, due to the fact that in oil economies, revenue from taxes are minimal, we can expect that controlling for the impact of various taxes, a greater dependency on oil is likely to create less accountability.
For this second step, we depart from Shah"s (2005) specification by controlling for a country"s level of development (GDP per capita) and overall policy framework (trade openness ratio). We test whether variables capturing the dependence on various types of taxes as well as oil dependency are significantly associated with accountability. In this second step, we keep the same measure of voice and accountability. Table 4 gives the results of this second step. We use two measures of oil dependency. In specification 1, we use the share of oil exports in total exports and in the second one, we use the share oil exports in GDP from the World Development Indicators database. In both cases, controlling for development and policy variables, it appears that oil dependency has a negative association with accountability 9 . This confirms what is alluded to in the literature on the resource curse.
But what is striking is that, for countries relying on income taxes of individuals (measured as a share of total taxes), accountability is much higher (controlling for the same variables). By contrast, for countries relying on trade taxes, which can be associated with rents in some countries, accountability is lower (although the coefficient is not strongly significant). It is also worth noting that controlling for all these variables, Africa seems to suffer from a certain lack of accountability. That is also precisely why a fiscal contract needs to be established in African countries.
How can such a fiscal contract be achieved in poverty-ridden countries, where tax evasion is so high? In some oil-rich countries, there is an opportunity to redistribute part, or all, of the oil revenues before taxing them back. (2004) for Iraq), and letting them spend or save it. This is probably related to the fact that in developing countries, tax evasion is likely to be high (Newbery et al. 1987 , Bird et al. 2008 ) and direct taxation is relatively small (OECD 2008) . Therefore, higher direct taxation must be put in place after a higher redistribution share. But the main strength of oil economies lies in the fact that they benefit from sufficient revenues that they can share a part to citizens.
In the real world, the Alaska Permanent Fund is one of the few examples of oil redistribution schemes (Anderson 2002) . Despite strong government effectiveness and good governance, the current redistribution scheme is increasingly coming under criticism. It appears as if there is a growing apathy from the population on public spending scrutiny and gradually, investment in public goods is neglected. Some voices in Alaska are calling for the introduction of new taxes on individuals in order to create a fiscal contract. Some observers of the situation in Alaska seem to believe that without a taxation relationship, the efficiency of public spending will deteriorate.
In order to explicitly take account of this relationship, we present some characteristics of another option, which could be called: "citizen funds+": a share of oil revenues would be redistributed annually to any eligible citizen of the State/country, and from this amount, one part would be taxed to increase public scrutiny and broaden the tax base 10 .
We present in Table 5 a comparison among the standard approach (increase public scrutiny by donors and international NGOs), the Alaska model, and our proposal of a "Citizen Fund+" 11 .
Table 5: Weaknesses and Shortcomings of Various Schemes of Oil Redistribution Revenues
There are obviously some difficulties in implementing such schemes. First of all, what is the required level of political will and stability? Lederman et al. (2005) demonstrated empirically that political will and stability have a major impact on corruption and accountability; if a government does not want to implement such redistribution scheme, external pressure is likely to fail, and this mechanism cannot be seriously implemented.
Second, some critics of the Alaska model explain that in a low-capacity and corruption-ridden country, there will be even more leakages in the system and corruption (Hjort 2006) 12 . Focusing on Argentina and using a new sub-national 11 It is worth noting that the citizens fund ++ model is not exclusive from the current model based on pressure for increased transparency mainly from external pressure. 12 Ross (2007) also explains that this would not affect regional grievances, since those who live closer to the mineral"s source would continue to ask for a larger share of revenues, which can not be satisfied. Gervasoni (2007) demonstrates that intergovernmental revenuesharing rules that disproportionately favor the less populated (and more overrepresented) districts provide their incumbents with generous "fiscal federalism rents" that allow them to restrict democratic contestation and weaken checks and balances. It is possible that increasing redistribution schemes, most probably through sub-national institutions, would reduce accountability, but that is where the taxation element can play a role-to curb the apathy tendency of citizens when oil revenues are distributed. Moreover, Shah (2005) has demonstrated that accountability may be higher when fiscal decentralization is increased.
Concluding remarks and areas for future research
This paper demonstrates that without shaping a fiscal social contract through taxation of citizens in oil-rich economies, the outcome of public spending will probably remain low despite increased pressure for transparency. The line of argument is straightforward: citizens are more likely to hold their governments accountable when they have to pay more taxes; and as a result, the governments have incentives to design and implement policies that improve the welfare of the population (See for example, More 2004). However, in a poverty-ridden country, without prior redistribution of a small share to citizens, taxation is likely to remain impossible.
The feasiblity and complexity of such schemes need to be addressed. But aside from Norway, no large oil-rich economy has been successful in achieving efficient public spending, despite external pressure for more transparency.
It is obvious that many questions need to be answered 13 such as the existing capacity of revenue administration and the tax culture in a country, which taxing instruments (e.g., direct personal income tax, property taxes or some types of indirect 13 We leave aside the question of what should be the share to redistribute since it is essentially an issue of consensus to reach between elites and informed citizens. 
